Recent Cases - Applying Sington

Michigan Court of Appeals

Applying Sington

In Miller v Grand Haven Stamped Products Co (CA Docket No. 278235, rel’d April 1, 2008), the Court of Appeals reversed the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission’s and Magistrate’s open award of benefits on the basis that they had misapplied Sington.

The plaintiff in this case works for an automobile components manufacturer. She suffered a work-related right knee injury. At the time of her injury, she was working up to 60 hours a week. Following arthroscopic surgery, she returned to work with restrictions requiring a sit/stand option. Post-injury, she performed different jobs within these restrictions, some of where ended when they were outsourced to other countries and some of which paid less than she earned at the time of injury. After her benefits were terminated, plaintiff filed her application seeking a reinstatement of partial disability benefits.

The Magistrate and Appellate Commission found that plaintiff was disabled under Sington and granted her an open award of benefits.

The Court of Appeals reversed saying “[p]laintiff is not disabled under Sington.” After reviewing Sington’s discussion of both the first and second sentences of MCL 418.301(4), the Court of Appeals in discussing the definition of disability in the first sentence says plaintiff did not prove “disability” because:

One of the factual matters to consider when making a disability determination is whether there continues to be a substantial job market for the work for which the employee is both trained at qualified. [Sington, supra] at 157. Here, the record establishes that the piecework job that plaintiff held in the 1980s, at which she earned $15 to $17 an hour, has not existed since the 1980s. There is no evidence in the record that there is any market, let alone a substantial job market, for such work at present. Accordingly, the piecework job has no relevance for purposes of establishing plaintiff’s maximum wage earning capacity. Furthermore, although the evidence demonstrated a link between plaintiff’s injury and her loss of the opportunity to work in other cells within defendant’s plant, there was no showing that plaintiff would earn a greater hourly wage if she worked in any other cell.

With respect to the second sentence of § 301(4) and its obligation to link wage loss to a disability, the Court of Appeals added:

Moreover, although plaintiff demonstrated that she had lost significant earning capacity, as reflected by her loss of overtime work, the evidence demonstrates that this loss of earning capacity is not attributable to her injury, but to the changing fortunes and efficiencies of the automotive industry and the terms of her union contract.

The Court of Appeals then added that, given pay raises, plaintiff now “realizes her maximum wage earning capacity” and her work injury “has had no adverse impact on her maximum wage earning capacity.”